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ABSTRACT 
Children’s imitation is not random, but depends on the context of the demonstration and 
imitation opportunity. For example, children are more likely to copy acts modeled by multiple 
people versus a single individual. In this study, I investigate the mechanisms underlying this 
phenomenon by manipulating the number of demonstrators and mode of presentation for a goal-
directed task. Children saw either one or two adults demonstrate unnecessary target acts while 
opening boxes to retrieve toys, and demonstrations were presented either live or on video. 
Children imitated the target acts at equal rates across conditions. This may reflect children’s 
heightened attention to reproducing the salient goal (i.e., opening the box to retrieve a toy) as 
opposed to copying the acts used to achieve the goal. Future studies should manipulate children’s 
prior experiences, goal salience, and the majority influence to determine the relative importance 
of each of these factors in guiding social learning.  
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1     INTRODUCTION 
As children grow up, they are faced with the task of acquiring countless skills and 
behaviors in order to become capable members of society. Some of a child’s learning occurs 
through direct instruction, either in a formal setting (i.e., from a teacher in a classroom) or in 
everyday life (i.e., from a parent at home), and from independent trial and error and explorative 
play (Steinberg, Belsky, Meyer, 1991). Still, each of these learning strategies involves a fair 
amount of conscious effort on the part of the child, and cannot wholly account for the rapid 
achievement of skills. Scientists have additionally explained some of children’s development as 
a product of observational learning (Berk, 1996). Instead of seeking out explicit learning 
opportunities, children may encode and reproduce adults’ everyday actions.  Indeed, even within 
the early days of infancy, infants will reproduce facial gestures (Meltzoff & Moore, 1983) and by 
one year of age they will spontaneously copy object-centered actions (Want & Harris, 2002).  
The process of imitation has been extensively studied, including comparison of humans 
and chimpanzees (e.g., Horner & Whiten, 2005; Tennie, Greve, Getscher, & Call, 2008) and is 
experiencing a renewed interest in the literature. Specifically, researchers have a particular 
interest in when and what children imitate. How do children know what is important to copy and 
retain for future use, and how do they know what to ignore? The goal of the present study is to 
examine how the context of the imitation opportunity (specifically, the number of demonstrators 
a child sees and their mode of presentation), in combination with task features, affect imitation. 
1.1 Faithful Imitation and Complex Culture 
Children’s earliest imitation tends to involve copying primarily the physical outcomes of 
others’ behaviors (Zmyj, Daum, & Aschersleben, 2009). During the second year of life, children 
also begin to reproduce the specific acts a model uses to complete those goals (Nielsen, 2006; 
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Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005). For example, after seeing an adult use a rake-
like tool retrieve a toy, children are likely to reproduce the exact means they saw (i.e., using an 
edge or raking) to achieve the outcome of retrieving the toy (Nagell, Olguin, & Tomasello, 
1993). Through early elementary school and even in adulthood, individuals imitate entire action 
sequences, even when some actions are clearly and visibly unnecessary (e.g., McGuigan, 
Whiten, Flynn, & Horner, 2007; Nielsen & Blank, 2011; Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2009). 
Faithful imitation is present even in remote human populations. Nielsen and Tomaselli 
(2010) found that Kalahari Bushman children imitated causally irrelevant actions at similar rates 
to a typical Australian sample. The Kalahari are a group who do not engage in direct pedagogy 
with children, and these results are taken to suggest that high imitative fidelity is not the result of 
Western pedagogical emphasis. This suggests that the tendency to copy another’s exact means is 
a ubiquitous human trait. 
In contrast, nonhuman primates rarely copy the exact means an adult uses to produce 
outcomes (e.g., Call, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2005; Tennie, Greve, Getscher, & Call, 2010). 
Comparative research has found that our closest evolutionary relatives, chimpanzees, ignore 
faithful copying and instead use an emulative approach when sufficient causal knowledge is 
made available (Horner & Whiten, 2003). This was found in direct contrast to the performance 
of 3- and 4-year-old children, who more often adopted an imitative approach, regardless of the 
availability of causal information. Similarly, even children as old as ten are found to copy the 
means to an outcome exactly, even when it is not the most efficient strategy (DiYanni, Nini, & 
Rheel, 2011). With this in mind, researchers have investigated faithful imitation to better 
understand human learning and how it differs from that of other primate species. 
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Some researchers have posited that imitating not only the outcomes of others’ behaviors, 
but also the exact means used, serves an important function for the development of complex 
culture. In particular, faithful imitation may allow for cultural “ratcheting” by allowing an 
individual to take in everything that another person does and then make modifications to it 
(Tomasello, 1999). This optimized method can then be passed on to others and modified further, 
allowing for a methodological advancement along generations. Accordingly, faithful copying 
and cultural ratcheting are two processes that appear to be unique to humans (Dean, Kendal, 
Schapiro, Thierry, & Laland, 2012).  
1.2 Factors Guiding Imitation 
Although the ability to copy acts in precise detail may be useful, it is not always an 
efficient strategy.  Blindly copying everything observed would lead children’s behaviors to 
become a jumble of mistakes and miscues. Instead, children also make use of a variety of 
contextual cues and strategies to guide their imitation. For example, children pay attention to 
intentionality when deciding what behaviors to imitate. When actions appear accidental, children 
are less likely to copy modeled behaviors (Carpenter, Akhtar & Tomasello, 1998). Children also 
take into account situational constraints and the goal at hand. For example, when an adult 
modeled turning on a light by pressing it with their forehead, children were only more likely to 
imitate these exact means of turning on the light when the adult’s hands were not occupied 
(Gergely, Bekkering, & Kiraly, 2002).  
In addition, children are more likely to imitate adults’ exact behaviors as opposed to 
those of their peers, even when the younger demonstrator explicitly states their competency 
(Wood, Kendal, & Flynn, 2012). This bias of attributing expertise to older individuals may 
represent one way that children avoid adopting inefficient or erroneous behaviors of their 
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inexperienced peers. It is also possible that this adults-as-experts bias is a culturally embedded 
learning strategy that is hard to extinguish, even with explicit task prompts. Although children 
often copy faithfully, attention to these types of cues may guide children to adopt a rational 
strategy where appropriate. 
Another efficient learning strategy may be to copy what multiple individuals do. It makes 
intuitive sense that children can circumvent adopting an individual’s idiosyncrasies by paying 
attention to and reproducing the common behaviors of the many people they see. Recent research 
has found that this is indeed the case; children are more likely to adopt the response of a majority 
as opposed to that of an individual.  
1.3 Majority-biased Transmission 
To date, there have been two studies that have demonstrated that children are more likely 
to adopt the behaviors of a majority than those of an individual. The first of these studies, by 
Haun, Rekers, and Tomasello (2012), dubbed this phenomenon “majority-biased transmission”. 
In their study, children watched either one or three adults drop a ball down a colored tube. There 
were three different tubes to choose from, and the total number of demonstrations was equal 
across conditions. When later given the opportunity to drop a ball down one of the tubes, 
children were more likely to drop it down the same color tube as had been selected by the 
majority, and not the response demonstrated by an individual multiple times. Chimpanzees’ 
responses also showed a pattern of majority-biased transmission, which suggests that this 
response strategy is shared with our closest biological relatives.  
Results from another recent study have provided evidence of increased imitation in 
response to multiple individuals (Herrmann, Legare, Harris, & Whitehouse, 2013). In their study, 
children watched video displays of either one or two adults demonstrating an action sequence of 
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pushing and tapping on differently colored pegs using a mallet. The task was designed to 
replicate performing a ritual, and as such it had no obvious physical goal, other than changing the 
position of the pegs. Children’s imitation was scored by allocating one point for reproduction of 
each part of the demonstration, with a maximum score of six points. They found that children 
had significantly higher imitation scores after viewing two successive demonstrators, in 
comparison to viewing one demonstrator model the action sequence twice.  
1.4 Explanations for Majority-biased Transmission 
There are several possible explanations for why children and chimpanzees choose to copy 
what the majority of individuals do. Authors of the original findings of majority-biased 
transmission posit that it is an efficient means for learning because the response of the majority is 
likely to be “safer, more reliable, and more productive” (Haun, et al., 2012, p. 727). To put it 
another way, the majority behavior represents an “expert” response that is potentially useful or 
efficient. It makes sense that children would want to copy what most people do.  
However, it is important to note that the task used in the original paper (dropping a ball 
down a tube) is fairly simple, and does not produce an obvious physical reward or goal. 
Therefore, it remains to be seen whether majority-biased transmission extends to more functional 
or goal-directed acts. If children view the majority as a useful expert, then we would expect 
children to imitate the majority behaviors in goal-directed tasks, where ‘doing it right’ is 
important. 
The more recent study of majority-biased transmission also uses a non-goal-directed task, 
although this is because these authors approach majority-biased transmission from a different 
perspective. Instead of focusing on the majority response as one that is ‘safer’ and ‘more 
reliable’, Herrmann and colleagues (2013) suggested that copying the majority is how children 
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learn social conventions and rituals. These are sequences of behaviors that often have no obvious 
physical goal, and accordingly, their task includes an action sequence that produces no outcome 
on the stimuli. 
An unaddressed explanation for majority-biased transmission is that it is socially 
motivated. Many researchers have explained faithful imitation as a mechanism by which social 
affiliation is achieved. Notably proposed by Uzgiris (1981), imitation is not only an efficient way 
to learn about the world, but can also be a way we establish affiliation and “likeness” with other 
people. This idea remains very prevalent today, with many authors explaining the robustness of 
faithful imitation as the result of an engrained social process that facilitates interactions between 
people. In support of this proposal, recent studies show that manipulating the social context of a 
task can affect children’s imitation. For example, children are more likely to copy irrelevant acts 
leading to an outcome when the person who demonstrated the acts is present to watch (Nielsen & 
Blank, 2011). This suggests that imitation is employed to achieve a perceived social benefit. 
Another study varied the social responsiveness of demonstrators using both pre-recorded videos 
and Skype, revealing higher imitation performance with the socially interactive model (Nielsen, 
Simcock, & Jenkins, 2008). 
Given that social context determines children’s faithful imitation, it is possible that 
majority-biased transmission could be explained as a socially motivated process. Using multiple 
demonstrators presents a heightened social pressure, or enhanced opportunity to affiliate via 
imitation, which could increase children’s copying. 
1.5 Current Study 
The goal for the current study is to address the role of two explanations for majority-
biased transmission. First, in the current study I address the role of expertise by using explicitly 
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goal-directed acts. Specifically, in this task, children interact with different types of boxes 
containing toys. Before viewing demonstrations, children are given the opportunity to 
manipulate the boxes and open them, which highlights the goal of the task – opening the boxes to 
retrieve the toys. Allowing children to have a successful experience with the boxes prior to 
demonstrations not only underscores the goal of retrieving the toy, but should prevent ceiling 
levels of imitation across conditions.  
After their initial experience with the boxes, children view either one or two adults 
demonstrate opening the boxes while employing a causally irrelevant act (e.g., turning a switch 
attached to the side of the box). Research has found that children imitate irrelevant acts even 
when they recognize that the acts are unnecessary to achieving a goal (Lyons, Young, & Keil, 
2007). Thus, we expect children to imitate in this task, despite their knowledge that the acts are 
unnecessary. If majority-biased transmission occurs in goal-directed tasks, then children should 
copy the irrelevant act more often after viewing two demonstrators, rather than one.  
A second question addressed in the current study regards the extent to which majority-
biased transmission is a socially motivated phenomenon. Previous research has manipulated the 
social context of an imitation task using live and video models (e.g., Nielsen, Simcock, & 
Jenkins, 2008); in the current task, children see either live or videotaped demonstrations. If 
majority-biased transmission is motivated by social affiliation via imitation, then it should only 
occur in the live demonstration condition. However, it is possible that majority-biased 
transmission is robust regardless of the affiliative opportunity, in which case it may also occur in 
response to video demonstrations. 
It is important to note that a large amount of research has found that children imitate less 
following video demonstrations, in comparison to live ones. This is said to reflect a “video 
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deficit effect” by which children learn substantially less from 2-D video displays in comparison 
to 3-D, interactive live ones. (Anderson & Pempek, 2005; Barr, 2010). However, there are 
several examples of imitation following video demonstrations in recent research literature (e.g 
DiYanni, et al. 2011; McGuigan, et al., 2007; Wood, et al., 2012 Zmyj, et al., 2010). It has also 
been shown that children are capable of learning from video by two years of age (Brito, et al., 
2012). It is still unclear whether majority-biased transmission can be induced following video 
demonstrations. If social motivation plays only a limited role in majority-biased transmission, it 
is possible that there will be equal levels of imitation in both the live and video conditions. 
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2 METHOD 
2.1 Participants 
Forty three-year-olds (M = 37.1 months, SD = 2.7; 17 males) were recruited from the 
Learning and Development Lab Subjects Database for this study. This database includes families 
living in and around the city of Atlanta. In our sample, 55% of families self-identified as White, 
27.5% as Black/African-American, and 15% as mixed race (one family did not report ethnicity). 
In addition, 80% of families self-identified as Non-Hispanic/Latino and 15% as Hispanic/Latino 
(two families did not specify).  
2.2 Materials 
Four types of boxes were used, and there were two boxes of each type. Each box 
contained a unique, age-appropriate toy that fit easily within the box. Each box could be easily 
opened with a simple manipulation (e.g., pulling a drawer out, lifting the top). There was also an 
attachment on each box (e.g., a plastic or metal piece, a carrying handle) that was manipulated 
during the adult demonstration (the target act). The manipulated attachments were superficial 
and did not affect how the boxes opened. The boxes and the target acts associated with each are 
detailed in Table 1.  
In the video condition, children viewed demonstrations on a portable DVD player (11.5 
cm x 20 cm). 
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Table 1 
 
Description of Materials 
 
Box type Target Act       Photo 
Black Drawer 
 
Turn side wheel switch 
to make a clicking noise  
 
Blue Knob Box 
 
 
Squeeze metal piece 
with thumb and 
forefinger 
 
Heart box 
 
Swipe white plastic 
piece with forefinger 
 
Suitcase 
 
Flip blue carrying 
handle up and down 
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2.3 Design 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two modality conditions (live or video) 
and all participants saw either one or two demonstrators; this created an experiment with a 2x2 
mixed factors design. In the video condition, children viewed demonstrations by either one or 
two adult models in video format. In the live condition, live adult demonstrators replaced the 
videos. In both conditions, the demonstrators were unfamiliar to the child. 
The presentation order of boxes and order of demonstrators was counterbalanced across 
participants. Specifically, the first two demonstrations of each session always contained the same 
number of models (one or two), and it switched for the second two demonstrations. 
2.4 Procedure 
There were four components of the task. The task was identical for each pair of boxes, 
which produced four trials for comparison and analyses. The only differences between the live 
and video conditions existed in part (3) of the task, which is the demonstration (see Figure 1). 
The task for each set of boxes proceeded as follows: 
(1) Introduction to boxes and toys. An adult experimenter sat across from the child at a small 
table inside a laboratory testing room. The experimenter brought up the pair of boxes 
from behind the table. The boxes were open and the toys were clearly visible. The 
experimenter introduced each of the toys to the child. After the child had a chance to play 
with each of the two toys, the toys were placed back inside the boxes and the 
experimenter closed the boxes. This part of the procedure ensured that the children knew 
what is inside the boxes, and that the boxes were identical. After the boxes were closed 
with the toys inside, the experimenter took both boxes below the table and out of the 
child’s sight. 
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(2) Successful experience with first box. The experimenter brought up one of the boxes, 
presented it to the child, and said something like, “Why don’t you try to open it?” The 
child was then allowed to interact with the box. Children almost always opened the boxes 
easily without further direct instruction. After the child opened the box, the experimenter 
removed it from view by placing it back under the table. 
(3) Demonstration. In the video condition, the experimenter brought up a DVD player and 
placed it on the table. The experimenter directed the child’s attention by saying 
something like “Let’s see what they do in the video”. The video demonstrators were male 
and female. 
In the live condition, the two adult demonstrators stayed in the room throughout 
the task, in addition to the experimenter who directed the task. The demonstrators did not 
interact with the child aside from providing the demonstrations, which were identical to 
those presented in the video. A male and female were not always available to 
demonstrate; in some cases, two females demonstrated.  
The target acts were modeled on both boxes in each set. In the single 
demonstrator condition, the adult demonstrated the target act twice (once on each box). In 
the two demonstrator condition, each demonstrator modeled the target act once. This 
controlled for the total number of demonstrations per condition. The boxes and toys used 
in the video were the same ones used in the test room.  
(4) Imitation opportunity. After viewing each demonstration including the target actions, the 
child was presented with the second box (i.e., the box he/she had not already opened). 
The experimenter said something like, “Why don’t you try to open this one?” The child 
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was allowed to interact with each box until he/she has successfully opened it or he/she 
lost interest in the task. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Photographic description of task progression. 
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3 RESULTS 
3.1 Scoring 
Children’s imitation performance was scored with a yes/no (1/0) judgment in regards to 
their production of the target act (one per object). Children’s performance of the target act was 
scored on both the first and second boxes. Performance on the first box of each set provides a 
baseline measure of how often children spontaneously execute the target act, whereas 
performance on the second box represents a standard measure of imitation. The first dependent 
measure is children’s imitation score (sum of target act completions during imitation 
opportunity; range 0 to 4, or 0 to 2 for each set of demonstrators). Difference scores were 
calculated by subtracting the total number of target acts completed on the first boxes (children’s 
baseline rate of producing the target acts) from imitation scores (range -4 to 4). Difference scores 
can be compared to zero to assess children’s learning of the target act from pre-demonstration to 
post-demonstration.  
To address the possibility that children paid more attention when viewing one modality 
versus the other, a randomly selected 27.5% of subjects (n = 11) were coded on how long they 
spent looking at the demonstrations. Research assistants who were blind to the research 
hypothesis scored from video the times at which children looked to and from the live and video 
demonstrations, to the video frame.  There are 30 video frames per second. 
To assess reliability, imitation scores were recoded for a randomly selected 30% of 
subjects (n = 12), ICC(1,9) = .89. 
3.2 Preliminary Analyses 
A preliminary analysis using a 2(participant gender) x 4(counterbalancing order) x 
4(object) repeated measures ANOVA revealed no significant interactions of these variables. 
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There were no effects of gender or counterbalancing order; therefore, we collapsed across these 
groups for analyses. 
The percent of the total demonstration time spent looking at the displays did not differ 
between subjects in the live (M = 98.6%, SD = 2.25) and video conditions (M = 96.5%, SD = 
3.27), t(9) = 1.26, p = .239. Percent of time spent looking also did not differ between viewing 
one demonstrator (M = 96.1%, SD = 4.97) or two demonstrators (M = 99.1%, SD = 2.14), t(10) = 
1.87, p = .09.  
3.3 Main Analyses 
3.3.1 Imitation Scores 
A 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA was used to investigate the effects of number of 
demonstrators and demonstration modality on imitation scores (see Figure 2). There was neither 
a main effect of number of demonstrators, F(1,38) = 0, or demonstration modality, F(1,38) = 
.087, p = .77, on imitation scores. Additionally, there was no interaction of number of 
demonstrators and demonstration modality on imitation scores, F(1,38) = 1.03, p = .32. 
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Figure 2. Mean imitation scores (+/- SEM) by number of demonstrators and demonstration 
modality. 
 
It is possible that children’s behavior changed across trials. To account for this 
possibility, we separately analyzed imitation scores in the first two and second two trials with 
two 2 x 2 between-subjects ANOVAs. In these analyses, number of demonstrators was a 
between-subjects variable. In the first two trials, there was neither a main effect of number of 
demonstrators, F(1, 36) = .112, p = .74, or demonstration modality, F(1,36) = .062, p = .74, on 
imitation scores. There was also no interaction of these variables, F(1,36) = .020, p = .89 (see 
Figure 3). Although the pattern of imitation scores in the later trials is somewhat different (see 
Figure 4), again, there were no significant main effects of demonstrators (F(1,36) = .124, p = 
.73) or modality (F(1,36) = .077, p = .78) and no significant interaction (F(1,36) = 1.35, p = .25).  
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Figure 3. Mean imitation scores (+/- SEM) in the first two trials by number of demonstrators and 
demonstration modality. 
 
 
Figure 4. Mean imitation scores (+/- SEM) in the second two trials by number of demonstrators 
and demonstration modality. 
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3.3.2 Difference Scores 
To assess whether seeing the demonstration affected children’s production of the target 
acts, we examined difference scores in both the live and video conditions using one-sample t-
tests. Difference scores from children in the live condition (M = 1.00; SD = 0.97) were 
significantly greater than zero, t(19) = 4.60, p < .001, indicating imitation. The same was true for 
children in the video condition (M = 0.85; SD = 1.14), t(19) = 3.34, p = .003. 
We also ran the same 2 x 2 ANOVAs as we did in the previous section, except we 
replaced imitation scores with difference scores as the dependent variable. The pattern of the 
results was similar to what was found with imitation scores. There were no significant main 
effects of number of demonstrators, F(1,38) = 1.41, p  = .24; demonstration modality, F(1,38) = 
.201, p  = .66; or interaction between these variables, F(1,38) = .156, p  = .70. 
3.3.3 Children with Unsuccessful First Experience 
Some children (n = 15) were unable to get the first box open on some of the trials. We re-
ran the main analyses with these unsuccessful trials removed to account for the possibility that a 
prior unsuccessful experience could affect imitation. There were no significant differences in 
these analyses compared to the original results. 
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4 DISCUSSION 
Children showed evidence of imitating the target acts. Difference scores in both the live 
and video conditions were significantly greater than zero. This finding is encouraging because it 
shows that children did learn from both live and video of displays of one and two demonstrators.  
However, the current results show no effect of either of the experimental manipulations. For one, 
imitation was not affected by the number of demonstrators (one or two) viewed. Thus, I did not 
find evidence of majority-biased transmission.  Second, children in the live condition did not 
imitate more than those in the video condition. This suggests a limited role of social motivation 
driving imitation on this task. 
There are several possible explanations for why the experimental manipulations did not 
produce significant differences in the current study. It is important to note that the current task is 
similar in many ways to previous tasks that have elicited the expected effects. For one, past 
studies have found increased imitation after children viewed video displays of two demonstrators 
in comparison to one demonstrator acting twice (Herrmann, et al., 2013). The age range tested 
here (three years) also fits within the range of ages where majority-biased transmission has been 
previously found (two to four years). Previous work has manipulated the social context of 
imitation by using live versus video displays, with results of increased imitation in response to 
live models in the room (Nielsen & Blank, 2011; Nielsen, Simcock, & Jenkins, 2008). Lastly, 
this type of imitation task has produced variable levels of imitation across experimental 
manipulations in prior studies (Williamson, Meltzoff, & Markman, 2008). 
With these points in mind, in the next sections I evaluate explanations for majority-biased 
transmission, present hypotheses of why null results were obtained, and outline potential future 
studies that could clarify these issues. 
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4.1 The Majority as an Expert Response 
The goal of this study was to evaluate different possible underlying causes of majority-
biased transmission. The original authors documenting this effect proposed that it is a 
mechanism by which individuals learn “safer, more reliable, and more productive” behaviors 
(Haun, et al., 2012, p. 727). Taken a step further, individuals may view the majority response as 
an expert response. There is sufficient evidence showing that perceptions of expertise, in general, 
guide children’s faithful imitation (e.g., Wood, et al., 2012). However, in the present goal-
directed task, children showed no evidence of imitating the majority at higher rates than in 
response to an individual. These null results support the possibility that children do not view the 
majority response as an expert response. This strong interpretation of these findings would 
suggest that the effect of majority-biased transmission found in past studies is due to other 
factors, such as the social situation within the tasks. 
Before drawing this strong conclusion, however, an alternate explanation must be 
considered: children may view the majority response as an expert response but do not make use 
of this expertise in the current imitation paradigm. 
4.1.1 The Effect of Prior Experience on Imitating the Majority 
One feature of the current task that may have influenced children’s imitation of the 
majority response is that participants were allowed to complete the overall goal of the task (i.e., 
opening the box to retrieve a toy) prior to viewing the demonstrations. This part of the procedure 
was included because it allowed measurement of children’s initial rates of target act production 
and also to ensure the goal was salient to them. However, these initial experiences also provided 
children an efficient response for the task. This may have overridden children’s consideration of 
other contextual factors in imitation (e.g., number of demonstrators or demonstration modality), 
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which could explain why there were no differences. A logical next step in this line of research is 
to remove the initial successful experience and investigate whether majority-biased transmission 
can occur with the same materials and design. 
Data collection for this project has already begun. So far, I have tested both three- and 
four-year-olds using the same method, but have removed the initial successful experience of 
opening the boxes. Although data collection is still in progress, there is trend toward majority-
biased transmission, with greater imitation scores after viewing two demonstrators compared to 
one demonstrator. Taken together, these findings seem to suggest that children value their own 
experiences more highly than a model’s example when executing functional acts on objects, even 
when they see multiple models. 
4.1.2 The Effect of Goals on Imitating the Majority 
Another element that may affect children’s use of the expertise of the majority is that this 
was a goal-directed task. My hypothesis was that having a goal should emphasize the importance 
of expertise. However, it is possible that this type of task, instead, de-emphasized the importance 
of the specific acts or means leading to that goal. Some research has found that children imitate 
with higher fidelity when there is no obvious physical goal at hand (e.g., Bekkering, 
Wohlschläger, & Gattis, 2000; Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2005; Williamson & Markman, 
2006). In contrast, when acts have a clear goal, children may be more likely to disregard the 
adult’s exact actions in favor of producing the physical outcome. Thus, the goal in the current 
task may have made the manipulation of the number of demonstrators less effective for the 
peripheral target act. 
One way to address the role of a physical goal within the design of the current task would 
be to remove the goal of retrieving the toy. The design of this modified task would be identical to 
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what was used here, with the exception that there would be no toys inside the boxes. The 
demonstrations would then consist of the adult(s) manipulating parts of the box, but producing 
no physical change in the end-state of the task. The child’s attention may then shift more to 
production of the target act, and majority-biased transmission could be elicited. 
4.2 The Role of Social Motivation in Response to a Majority 
An alternative hypothesis we proposed to explain majority-biased transmission is that it is 
the result of social pressure, instead of a perception of expertise. Previous research has found that 
children’s imitation is enhanced by having demonstrators present to see their acts copied 
(Nielsen & Blank, 2011) and when the model is socially responsive (Nielsen, Simcock, & 
Jenkins, 2008), but in the present study, the presence of live demonstrators did not increase 
imitation. Given that the current results seem to contradict prior findings, it is difficult to assess 
the hypothesis of whether or not majority-biased transmission is socially motivated. It remains 
possible that majority-biased transmission reflects some social underpinnings, but was not 
induced with the live and video manipulations used here. However, I can conclude that having 
two demonstrators present to watch the child imitate is not sufficient, in itself, to elicit majority-
biased transmission. 
It seems intuitive that I could better investigate the social influence of the majority by 
using more than two demonstrators. One important consideration in manipulating of the number 
of actors is to delineate majority-biased transmission versus conformist transmission. Past 
research has shown that adults conform to others’ responses, even when they have strong reason 
to believe that the majority is wrong (e.g., Asch, 1956), and more recent work has revealed 
similar effects in four-year-olds (Haun & Tomasello, 2011). These studies have explained 
conformity as a result of social pressure, whereas the current findings provide at least some 
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evidence against the possibility that majority-biased transmission is entirely social. Future work 
may aim to clarify the (potentially different) mechanisms that underlie these two processes. 
4.3 Conclusions 
Many past studies of children’s imitation have varied only a single factor, such as the 
salience of a physical goal, a model’s expertise, or the presence of a social partner. Results from 
these studies have revealed a number of factors that affect children’s imitation. Although the 
current study was designed to vary only two of these features, namely, the mode of presentation 
and the number of demonstrators, the null results complicated matters. 
In order to explain these results in the context of previous studies, it was necessary to 
evaluate several factors that may have influenced imitation. Taking together the current and 
previous findings, one can begin to examine how multiple factors interact in children’s imitation. 
Although future work is certainly needed, it seems from the current results that task goal and 
prior experience may have been most important, whereas the presence of multiple demonstrators 
was less influential. 
Understanding the relative importance of the different factors that guide imitation will 
help us to explain exactly why and when children copy others’ actions. This information could 
give us a better idea of how children learn, and could inform how we teach children using 
demonstrative cues. Although the current study does not conclusively answer these questions, it 
provides a motivation for future work investigating how various task features interact and affect 
imitation.  
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